The social power of regret: The effect of social appraisal and anticipated emotions on fair and unfair allocations in resource dilemmas by van der Schalk, Job et al.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
The Social Power of Regret: The Effect of Social Appraisal
and Anticipated Emotions on Fair and Unfair Allocations
in Resource Dilemmas
Job van der Schalk, Toon Kuppens, Martin Bruder, and Antony S. R. Manstead
Online First Publication, November 10, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000036
CITATION
van der Schalk, J., Kuppens, T., Bruder, M., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2014, November 10). The
Social Power of Regret: The Effect of Social Appraisal and Anticipated Emotions on Fair and
Unfair Allocations in Resource Dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000036
The Social Power of Regret: The Effect of Social Appraisal
and Anticipated Emotions on Fair and Unfair Allocations
in Resource Dilemmas
Job van der Schalk
Cardiff University
Toon Kuppens
University of Groningen
Martin Bruder
University of Konstanz
Antony S. R. Manstead
Cardiff University
We investigated how another person’s emotions about resource allocation decisions influence observers’
resource allocations by influencing the emotions that observers anticipate feeling if they were to act in the
same way. Participants were exposed to an exemplar who made a fair or unfair division in an economic game
and expressed pride or regret about this decision. Participants then made their own resource allocation
decisions. Exemplar regret about acting fairly decreased the incidence of fair behavior (Studies 1A and 1B).
Likewise, exemplar regret about acting unfairly increased the incidence of fair behavior (Study 2). The effect
of others’ emotions on observers’ behavior was mediated by the observers’ anticipated emotions. We discuss
our findings in light of the view that social appraisal and anticipated emotions are important tools for social
learning and may contribute to the formation and maintenance of social norms about greed and fairness.
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The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed, for lack of a better word, is
good. Greed is right, greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures
the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms; greed for life,
for money, for love, knowledge has marked the upward surge of mankind.
Gordon Gekko, in Wall Street (Director: Oliver Stone, 1987)
It was wrong . . . it was greed, pure and simple. I can’t say how sorry
I am and how deeply I regret my actions.
Dennis Kozlowski, former CEO of Tyco, at his parole hearing in 2013
after his conviction in 2005 for stealing $134 million from the company.
In everyday life, we are frequently confronted with the need to
make a decision about how to allocate resources (e.g., money or
time) between ourselves and one or more others. We know that
when making such decisions, people consider how they are likely
to feel about the consequences of their allocations and make use of
these anticipated feelings to guide the choices they make (see
Haselhuhn & Mellers, 2005; Mellers & McGraw, 2001; Van der
Schalk, Bruder, & Manstead, 2012). The current research exam-
ines whether these anticipated emotions and subsequent allocation
decisions are influenced by other people’s emotional expressions.
Observing someone (like Gordon Gekko in the above quote)
expressing pride about being greedy might lead us to anticipate
that we would feel good if we were to act in the same way and
thereby promote selfish allocation decisions. By contrast, witness-
ing someone like Dennis Kozlowski expressing regret about his
unfair behavior should lead us to anticipate feeling bad if we were
to be greedy and promote fair allocations.
Prior research shows that behavior in experimental games is
subject to social influence. Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) provided
allocators in a dictator game with information about the proportion
of subjects in a prior session who had been “fair” versus “selfish”;
participants made fairer decisions when they thought prior alloca-
tors had been fair (see also Fowler & Christakis, 2010; Krupka &
Weber, 2009). In the present research, our main theoretical focus
is on how others’ expressions of emotion (rather than their behav-
ior) influence the fairness of allocation decisions.
According to one theoretical perspective, a key way in which
emotions regulate behavior is through the anticipation of how we
would feel if we were to act in a certain way (Baumeister, Vohs,
DeWall, & Zhang, 2007). On this account, the experience of, say,
guilt arising from the realization that one has harmed another
person shapes future behavior by leaving an “affective residue”
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that is activated when similar circumstances arise in the future. The
anticipation of the negative affect that would be experienced if one
were to act in a similar way shapes behavior in the new setting by
steering one away from this course of action.
These processes of anticipating affect on the basis of past
behavior that had affective consequences are intrapersonal. In the
current research, we examine whether interpersonal processes can
be integrated into this theoretical account. Social appraisal theory
(Manstead & Fischer, 2001) proposes that when we perceive
others’ emotional reactions to an event, we infer the underlying
appraisals (Hareli & Hess, 2010; Scherer & Grandjean, 2008). This
influences social judgments (Mumenthaler & Sander, 2012) and
inferences about others’ intentions (de Melo, Carnevale, Read, &
Gratch, 2014), and it provides a basis for a shared understanding of
the emotional situation and for emotional convergence (Bruder,
Dosmukhambetova, Nerb, & Manstead, 2012; Bruder, Fischer, &
Manstead, 2014; Parkinson & Simons, 2009). In other words,
being exposed to how another person reacts emotionally to an
event can influence the way we appraise that event and thereby our
emotional responses to it. We propose that this process of social
appraisal similarly influences the anticipation of affect. Applied to
the issue of resource allocation, this suggests that how others react
emotionally to a division of resources that they have made should
influence the emotional reaction that we think we would experi-
ence when making such a division ourselves.
The Emotion as Social Information model (Van Kleef, 2009)
provides another theoretical explanation for the effects of emotion
expression on the behavior of observers. According to the model,
emotions can influence observers’ behavior by affecting inferences
about expressers’ intentions and/or by directly shaping affective
reactions. We propose a different route through which emotion
expressions can have an effect on the behavior of observers
through anticipated emotions.
Previous research on the role of emotions in resource allocation
decisions has tended to focus on the role of anger experienced by
those on the receiving end of unfair allocations. In the ultimatum
game (UG; Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982), the “alloca-
tor” decides how to divide a sum of money between self and other
by making an offer to the “responder.” The latter can either accept
the offer, in which case both players receive the division that was
proposed, or reject it, in which case neither player receives any-
thing. According to rational choice models of economic decision-
making, the responder should accept any offer, however low. It is
well established that offers of less than 20% of the total sum are
nevertheless more likely to be rejected than accepted (Bolton &
Zwick, 1995; Güth et al., 1982), and this supposedly irrational
rejection of unfair offers is related to responders’ anger (Pillutla &
Murnighan, 1996; see also van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman,
2006; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Mystrom, & Cohen, 2003). The
fact that responders’ anger is related to rejection of offers is
probably the reason why allocators make more generous offers to
responders who shows signs of anger, in order to avoid rejection of
their offer (Van Dijk, van Kleef, Steinel, & van Beest, 2008; see
also van Kleef, de Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, 2004b, 2010).
In the van Dijk et al. (2008) study, participants responded to
anger expressions of someone with whom they had an interdepen-
dent relationship (i.e., their opponent). The effect would likely be
different if the emotion came from someone with whom the
participant had an independent relationship (e.g., someone with the
same role as the allocator). In the latter case, the expression of
emotion does not carry information about what the opponent is
likely to do, but about the allocator’s own possible emotional
reaction to the offer s/he makes. In effect, the other person serves
as an exemplar of how one is likely to feel, and such anticipated
emotions might influence behavior.
These ideas are examined in the current studies. We test whether
learning that another person (exemplar) who felt proud or regretful
about allocating resources fairly or unfairly (a) influences a par-
ticipant’s own allocation behavior when playing the game and (b)
does so by influencing the emotions that the participant anticipates
experiencing if he or she were to act the same way as the exemplar.
We predicted that an exemplar who expresses regret about having
allocated resources fairly would elicit less generous offers than an
exemplar who expresses pride about having allocated resources
fairly; likewise, we predicted that an exemplar who expressed
regret about having allocated resources unfairly would elicit more
generous offers than an exemplar who expressed pride about
having allocated resources unfairly. These effects of an exemplar’s
emotion should be mediated by the participant’s own anticipated
emotions.
Studies 1A and 1B
Method
Participants and design. Studies 1A and 1B both had a 2
(behavior: fair, unfair)  3 (emotion: pride, regret, control)
between-subject design. There were 218 participants in Study 1A
(Mage  44.57 years; 61.9% female [2.3% undisclosed]). There
were 207 participants in Study 1B (Mage  46.64 years; 50.7%
female). They were recruited through an online loyalty program
and received points that could be used for online shopping as
compensation. A pilot study using a similar design is reported as
supplemental material (S1).
Materials. Participants played the UG online and the number
of “tokens” or monetary units (MUs) that allocators were willing
to share served as a measure of fair behavior. The resource for
which participants played was £100, represented by 50 MUs of £2
each. We explained that we would randomly select two pairs of
participants who would be paid in accordance with how they
played the game. All participants were allocators. After making
their offer in the UG, participants were asked to report the mini-
mum MU they would accept as an offer if they were a receiver in
the UG. Answers to this question were used to determine accep-
tance or rejection of offers made by the randomly selected partic-
ipants, and the £100 resource was divided in accordance with the
responses made by participants.
Participants were told that we were interested in their thoughts
and feelings about the game. To manipulate exemplar behavior and
emotion, participants in Study 1A were given the opportunity to
read “a transcript of the thoughts of a previous participant in this
experiment.” This person wrote that s/he had considered dividing
the 50 MUs in different ways: 45(self)–5(other), 25–25, or some-
thing in between these two options. The exemplar behavior ma-
nipulation was the choice the exemplar reported having made,
which was either a 25–25 split (fair behavior condition) or a 45–5
split (unfair behavior condition). It was also stated that this offer
was accepted. To manipulate emotion, the allocator expressed
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feeling “good,” “proud,” and “pleased” about the decision (pride
emotion condition) or feeling “bad,” “sorry,” and “regret” about
the decision (regret emotion condition). In the control emotion
condition, there was no mention of emotions in the thought tran-
script. The exemplar behavior and emotion manipulations were
crossed to create six different thought transcripts. In Study 1B, we
showed participants filmed recordings of exemplars who enacted
the thought protocols used in Study 1A. The exact wording of the
manipulations and the video recordings are available in the sup-
plemental online material (S2 and S3).
Participants reported their anticipated emotions directly before
playing the UG. Depending on behavior condition, we asked: “If
you were to divide the tokens in a similar way as the allocator did
in the thought transcript you just read [video you just saw] (that is,
if you made a 25–25 [45–5] split), to what extent would you feel
. . .”. We asked participants to report their anticipated emotions on
a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) for 10 different emotion
terms: pleased, proud, regretful, sorry, satisfied, relieved, embar-
rassed, foolish, guilty, and ashamed. We combined three antici-
pated emotion items into a single anticipated pride scale (pleased,
proud, and satisfied;   .91) and two anticipated emotion items
into a single anticipated regret scale (regretful and sorry;   .87).
Procedure. First, participants provided demographic informa-
tion and completed a measure of Social Value Orientation (SVO;
Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997). Participants then
received instructions for the UG. They were ostensibly randomly
assigned to the allocator role. In Study 1A, participants then read
the thought transcript that contained the behavior and emotion
manipulation, and they completed a set of comprehension checks
with feedback to ensure that they understood the rules of the UG.
In Study 1B, participants completed the comprehension checks and
viewed the film of the exemplar, who was always the same sex as
the participant. Participants in both studies then completed manip-
ulation checks, reported their anticipated emotions, and made their
UG offer. In the final part of the experiment, participants re-
sponded to an open-ended question about their thoughts and feel-
ings concerning the game, and they indicated the minimum num-
ber of MUs they would accept as an offer if they were a receiver
in the UG. Participants also completed a second manipulation
check and a different measure of SVO (Murphy, Ackermann, &
Handgraaf, 2011). In Study 1B, we also measured participants’
perceived closeness to the person in the video (Aron, Aron, &
Smollan, 1992).
Results
Participants. In Study 1B, 2 participants reported technical
problems with the playback of the video, and a further 19 partic-
ipants did not spend enough time on the video webpage to have
seen the entire video. In addition, the comments of one participant
in Study 1B showed that this person had not understood the UG.
All of these participants were excluded, and 185 participants
remained for analyses in Study 1B. No participants were excluded
in Study 1A.
Although the participants in Study 1A and Study 1B were
recruited on different occasions, everything apart from the medium
of delivery of the thought protocol was identical in the two studies.
Preliminary analyses of our key dependent measure revealed that
study (1A vs. 1B) did not interact significantly with exemplar
behavior, exemplar emotion, or their interaction. Therefore, we
report the analyses of the pooled data (403 participants in total).
Data treatment. Exploration of the data revealed that the key
dependent variable was not normally distributed (Kolmogorov–
Smirnov: D(403)  .22, p  .001), and that treating the offer as a
continuous dependent variable led to non-normally distributed
residuals (the distribution of offers is reported as a histogram in
supplemental material S4). Therefore, we decided to dichotomize
the main dependent variable: All offers of 25 were recoded as
1  fair offers (42.9%) and all offers of 24 were recoded as 0 
unfair offers (57.1%). We analyzed the effects of our manipula-
tions on the dichotomized offer variable using logistic regression,
controlling for study, gender, and all interactions with gender.
Analyses of the manipulation checks showed that manipulations
were successful. These are reported in the supplemental materials
(S5).
Offer level. The expected interaction between exemplar be-
havior and exemplar emotion was marginally significant, p .052.
Simple slope analyses revealed a significant effect of exemplar
emotion in the fair behavior condition, p  .007, but no effect of
exemplar emotion in the unfair behavior condition, p  .42. In the
fair behavior condition, participants in the regret condition were
less likely to make fair offers than were those in the control
condition, B  1.15, p  .003, odds ratio  0.32, but there was
no difference between the pride condition and the control condi-
tion, B  0.24, p  .53, odds ratio  0.79 (see Figure 1).
Mediation analysis revealed that the effect of exemplar regret on
offer in the fair behavior condition was fully mediated by an
increase in anticipated regret and a reduction in anticipated pride
(see Figure 2).
Discussion
The results provide support for our theoretical prediction that
exemplar emotion influences participants’ allocation behavior by
affecting participants’ anticipation of how they would feel. It could
be argued that the results of Studies 1A and 1B are the result of
strategic inferences about what kind offers would be rejected,
rather than anticipated emotions. In that view, the exemplar’s
behavior and expressed emotion may have influenced perceived
norms of what kind of offers are likely to be rejected, and partic-
ipants’ anticipated emotions may have merely correlated with the
expected outcome of the game. Therefore, in Study 2, we decided
to switch from the UG to the dictator game (DG; Kahneman,
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). The DG does not give the responder the
opportunity to reject the allocator’s offer; therefore, there is no
strategic component to the allocator’s behavior.
Exemplar emotion did not have an effect on allocation behavior
in the unfair condition. Given that only very few participants
(1.5%) made offers lower than or equal to 45:5 (see Figure S4 in
the supplemental materials), we reasoned that the offer of the
exemplar in the unfair condition may have struck participants as
surprising and may have thereby overshadowed the influence of
exemplar emotion. To test this reasoning, we ran a pilot study
(reported as supplemental material S6) and established that exem-
plar emotion had the predicted effect in the unfair condition when
this was varied in the context of less extreme unfair behavior
(35:15 instead of 45:5). Therefore, we used the 35:15 division as
the example of unfair behavior in Study 2.
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We also increased the relevance of the exemplar’s emotion and
enhanced the realism of the experimental task. In the context of
what appeared to be an online gaming environment, the exemplar
was now presented as the participant’s opponent in an initial DG,
rather than being a player in another unrelated game (as was the
case in Studies 1A and 1B). Exemplar behavior was manipulated
in a first DG through the offer that participants received (25:25 or
35:15). Exemplar emotion was manipulated using a filmed mes-
sage, ostensibly coming from the other player. Afterward, partic-
ipants were allocators in a second DG, which was independent
from the initial DG and played with a different person, and their
allocation behavior in that second game served as the main depen-
dent variable.
Study 2
Method
Participants and design. The study had a 2 (exemplar behav-
ior: fair vs. unfair)  2 (exemplar emotion: pride vs. regret)
between-subject design. Participant recruitment was achieved in
the same way as in the previous studies. There were 368 partici-
pants who completed the study (Mage 44.93 years; 55% female).
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure were
similar to those of Studies 1A and 1B. After providing demo-
graphic information and completing a measure of SVO (Murphy et
al., 2011), participants received detailed explanations about the
rules of the DG, the roles of the allocator and the receiver, and the
fact that they would be paired with two different players in two
separate games. They were informed that two randomly selected
participants would receive the monetary equivalent of the tokens
they won in the game, with each token worth £1. We told partic-
ipants that the study was concerned with participants’ thoughts and
feelings about the game and communication between players.
Because of this, filmed “game reviews” would be sent between the
players. After comprehension checks, participants entered what
appeared to be a virtual online environment. Participants were
assigned a pictorial gamer icon (“the bird”) and played their first
game against “the fish.”
In the first game all participants were receivers, although the
allocation to roles was ostensibly determined by chance. In the fair
offer condition, the other player offered the participant 25 of the
available 50 tokens. In the unfair offer condition, participants were
only offered 15 of the 50 tokens. After the game, participants
viewed a short film that contained the exemplar emotion manip-
ulation; here, the fellow player expressed either pride or regret
about her/his decision. The gender of participant and exemplar was
always the same. After the video, participants completed manip-
ulation checks and indicated (on scales from 1  not at all to 5 
very much) how they would feel if they were to divide the tokens
in the same way as the allocator in the first game had. These
ratings served as measures of anticipated pride (pleased, proud,
satisfied;   .93) and anticipated regret (regretful, sorry;  
.92).
In the second game, participants acted as allocators (a role that
again appeared to be determined by chance) and played against a
different player (“the snail”). Participants received 50 tokens and
were asked to make an offer to the receiver. The number of tokens
they offered was the main dependent variable. After making their
offer, participants were asked to provide their own game review in
written text (supposedly because of a webcam failure), answered a
second manipulation check, and completed a measure of closeness
to the person in the video (Aron et al., 1992). Finally, participants
were thanked and debriefed.
Results
Participants and data treatment. Twenty-one participants
reported problems with playing the video. In postexperimental
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of fair offers as a function of exemplar
behavior and exemplar emotion (data pooled from Studies 1A and 1B).
Figure 2. Indirect effect of exemplar regret (compared to control) on
odds of making a fair offer through self-reported anticipated regret and
pride in the fair behavior condition (data from Studies 1A and 1B).
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open-ended comments, another six participants showed clear in-
sight into the study design and hypotheses. These 27 participants
were excluded, and 341 participants remained for analysis. A
histogram of the distribution of offers is reported in the supple-
mental materials (S7). We again dichotomized the offers made in
the second game. Offers fewer than 25 tokens were recoded as
unfair offers (33.1%) and offers of 25 tokens were recoded as
fair offers (66.9%). We ran a logistic regression with exemplar
behavior (fair vs. unfair), exemplar emotion (regret vs. pride), and
gender as predictors. Analyses of the manipulation check data
showed that the manipulations were successful. Results are re-
ported in the supplemental materials (S8).
Offer level. In line with predictions, there was a significant
interaction between exemplar behavior and exemplar emotion,
B  1.50, p  .002, odds ratio  .22. Follow-up analyses
showed that participants who had received an unfair offer were
more likely to make a fair offer when the exemplar had ex-
pressed regret rather than pride, B  1.12, p  .001, odds
ratio  3.05 (see Figure 3). There was no effect of exemplar
emotion for participants who had received a fair offer,
B  .38, p  .30, odds ratio  .68. Mediation analysis further
revealed that the effect of exemplar regret on offer in the unfair
condition was mediated by an increase in anticipated regret and
a reduction in anticipated pride (see Figure 4). In addition, in
the fair condition— despite the lack of a direct effect of exem-
plar emotion on offer—there were significant indirect effects of
exemplar emotion (regret compared to pride) on offer through
anticipated regret, B  .18, 95% confidence interval
[–.52, .005], and anticipated pride, B  .15, 95% confi-
dence interval [–.46, .002].
Discussion
Participants who had received an unfair offer in the first game were
less likely to make an unfair offer in the second game when the
exemplar expressed regret rather than pride. Moreover, the indirect
effects of exemplar emotion on offer through anticipated emotions
were significant, demonstrating at least partial mediation. Although
there was no direct effect of exemplar emotion on offer in the fair
condition, the indirect effects via anticipated emotions were signifi-
cant and in the expected direction. This is consistent with the findings
of Studies 1A and 1B.
Extending the findings of Studies 1A and 1B, effects of exemplar
emotions were found when participants did not have to make strategic
decisions about the level at which offers might be rejected. In Study
2, the emotions of the exemplar did not provide information about the
kind of offers that might be accepted. Instead, the expressed emotions
only carried information about the kind of feelings that the participant
might experience if they were to behave similarly to or differently
from the exemplar. Therefore, Study 2 provides further support for an
explanation in terms of anticipated emotions.
One structural difference between Study 2 and Studies 1A and
1B was that participants played two consecutive games, first as a
receiver and then as an allocator. Being on the receiving end of a
fair division of resources might have made a fair division partic-
ularly salient and therefore made it more difficult for participants
to act unfairly themselves. This could help explain why the influ-
ence of exemplar emotion was less pronounced in the fair behavior
condition of Study 2.
It could be argued that the different results in the unfair condition
between Studies 1A and 1B and Study 2 are due to the differences
between the UG and the DG. However, we have evidence that speaks
against this. We ran another study that was highly similar to Study 2
except for the fact that participants played the UG rather than the DG.
As in Study 2, participants who had received an unfair offer (and had
accepted this offer) were less likely to make an unfair offer them-
selves when the exemplar expressed regret rather than pride (see
supplemental material S9).
It might also be thought that the lower percentage of fair offers
made in the unfair/pride condition reflects participants’ annoyance at
Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of fair offers as a function of exemplar
behavior and exemplar emotion (Study 2).
Figure 4. Indirect effect of exemplar regret (compared to pride) on odds
of making a fair offer through self-reported anticipated regret and pride in
the unfair behavior condition (Study 2).
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having received an unfair offer in the previous game. The measure of
perceived closeness to the exemplar speaks to this possibility. If unfair
offers made by participants reflected annoyance, then one would
expect unfair offers to be related to low closeness on the grounds that
you would not feel close to someone whose actions annoyed you to
the extent that you felt like treating another person unfairly. However,
in the unfair/pride condition, participants who made an unfair offer
felt closer (M 3.31) to the exemplar than did participants who made
a fair offer (M  2.27), F(1, 87)  8.14, p  .005. This supports an
explanation in terms of social appraisal rather than annoyance.
General Discussion
We found support for the prediction that emotion expressed by
a third party about a decision that he or she has taken influences
the decision taken by someone who observes that emotional ex-
pression. A third-party exemplar who expresses regret about acting
fairly elicits less fair behavior on the part of an observer than does
an exemplar who expresses pride about acting fairly (Studies 1A
and 1B); likewise, an exemplar who expresses regret about acting
unfairly elicits more fair behavior than does an exemplar who ex-
presses pride about acting unfairly (Study 2). The studies also shed
light on the process underlying these effects. We argue that others’
emotions about their decisions shape the behavior of observers by
influencing the emotions that observers anticipate experiencing if they
were to act in the same way (Baumeister et al., 2007).
Social psychology has a long tradition of demonstrating the
influence of exemplars on behavior (e.g., Asch, 1955; Bandura,
1965; Latané & Darley, 1968; Sherif, 1936), and in developmental
psychology it is well established that caregivers’ emotion expres-
sions help to shape how children deal with ambiguous situations
(Blair, 2003; Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985). Our re-
search suggests that the emotions of exemplars are also important
resources for social learning in adult life and that they exert their
influence through a combination of social appraisal and anticipated
emotions.
In the current research, we tested our predictions concerning social
appraisal and anticipated emotions in the context of two economic
games. One question that could be asked is whether the predictions
would have been supported if we had used other games, such as the
trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995), or real economic
decisions or decisions involving resource allocation that are not
straightforwardly economic in nature (e.g., volunteering time, effort,
or expertise on behalf of others). There is no a priori reason to suppose
that the process identified in the present research is one that is limited
to the economic games we used or indeed to economic games in
general. Rather, we propose that social appraisal and anticipated
emotions may be critical in the formation and maintenance of social
norms in a broad array of behavior domains. The expression of
self-conscious and sociomoral emotions demonstrates the values and
behaviors that are considered appropriate within a particular social
group whereas the anticipation of these emotions on the basis of
observing others’ expressions guides behavior in a way that is con-
sistent with these norms. On a broader level, this reciprocal relation-
ship between expression and anticipation of emotions might contrib-
ute to the maintenance of social order (Hochschild, 1979; Thoits,
2003).
Conclusion
Our general argument is that how others are seen to appraise and
respond emotionally to their own actions will influence the emotions
that observers anticipate experiencing and that these anticipated emo-
tions guide observers’ subsequent behavior. When the Gordon Gekko
character in the film Wall Street states that “greed . . . is good,” he
communicates a message that acting in one’s own interest is some-
thing positive, and he reinforces this by implying that it is something
in which individuals can take pride. In justifying his own behavior, he
thereby helps to establish a social norm that acting in one’s own
interest without concern for the welfare of others is appropriate.
Conversely, public displays of remorse about self-enrichment (like the
quote from Dennis Kozlowski presented in the introduction) may
serve an important societal function in that norms about fairness are
reinstated after transgressions of these norms. We should not be
surprised to find that expressions of emotions in situations such as
these have an influence on the behavior of witnesses.
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